INTRODUCTION
Karol Wolfke had a profound interest in questions of international law-making. His seminal work dealt with international customary law and its two constituent elements, i.e. practice and its acceptance as law. 1 Wolfke perceived that relevant practice was not limited to State practice sensu stricto, and he analysed, in particular, how the practice of International Organisations contributed to international law-making. 2 International courts, while in principle 'confined to ascertaining and applying law', may by their decisions either 'paralyse the development' of a customary rule or 'accelerate its ripening '. 3 Practice alone, however, does not suffice to create a rule of law. Wolfke firmly upheld that any practice must be accepted by States in order to create law. While customary law does not require explicit consent, a consensual element in the form of 'presumed acceptance' is needed. 4 This view has been recently confirmed by the International Law Commission in its draft conclusions on the identification of customary international law. 5 In fact, customary law and treaty law both rely on explicit or implicit state consent. Whereas explicit state consent is needed for a treaty to enter into force, implicit state consent informs its future evolution. Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) states as a general rule of interpretation that 'any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation' shall be taken into account. Thus, a practice accepted as law may either inform the interpretation of a treaty or create a new norm of customary law. The dividing line between treaty interpretation and creation of a new norm is difficult to draw. A striking example is Article 27(3) UN Charter. Whilst the text of the norm seems to indicate that Security Council resolutions may only be adopted with the affirmative vote of all five permanent members, constant Security Council practice merely recognises a veto right. According to this practice, which is now widely accepted as law, simple abstentions do not hinder a resolution from being adopted. This may be seen either as a far reaching interpretation of Article 27(3) UN Charter or, as Karol Wolfke did, 6 as a Charter modification through subsequent customary law. Anyhow, Wolfke is right in stating that treaties may, with time, 'become overgrown with practice of their implementation, more or less changing their original content.' 7 Evolution through subsequent practice is particularly marked in international human rights law, where international human rights bodies produce abundant practice. Here, the question arises as to whether the practice of these bodies alone suffices to determine the content of international human rights obligations or whether organ practice must be backed up by state practice or forms of implicit state consent. This question shall be analysed with regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) of 13 December 2006 8 and the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CeeRPD) established under 34 CRPD. Although the Convention is only ten years old, its Committee has already produced quite an important corpus of practice, and it has shown its willingness to construe the Convention in a rigorous way which makes important parts of current domestic state practice with regard to persons with disabilities illegal.
Section II introduces the CeeRPD and its practice before the lawmaking potential of CeeRPD documents is analysed in Sections III-V. Section III starts from the formal status of CeeRPD documents under the CRPD and Section IV explores their relevance as a subsidiary source before Section V considers them under the aspects of practice and State consent. Finally, some conclusions can be drawn in Section VI. So far, the Committee has adopted two General Comments on the equal recognition before the law 11 and on accessibility 12 . Moreover, eleven individual communications procedures were concluded by the end of 2015. Three communications were declared inadmissible. 13 Two other communications were held to be unfounded. 14 In six cases, the Committee concluded that there had been violations of the Convention. In two cases, the Committee criticised that persons with visual impairments had insufficient access to public services. 15 Sweden was reprehended for having refused a building permit for a hydrotherapy pool without paying attention to the special needs of a physically disabled person 16 and Argentina for not providing reasonable accommodation for prisoners with disabilities. 17 Hungary was criticised for withholding the right to vote in case of certain Among the Views on individual communications, the case of Bujdosó ea v Hungary 22 is particularly interesting for the purposes of the present contribution, because the Committee strictly excluded any exception to the right to vote related to any kind of disability. Thereby, the Committee implicitly rejected a common practice shared by many States to exclude the right to vote in case of mental or intellectual incapacity. According to Section 13(2) of the German Federal Elections Act (Bundeswahlgesetz), for instance, those who are placed under guardianship for all kind of affairs according to the German Civil Code do not have the right to vote. The same is true for incapacitated persons in Poland. 23 It is quite clear that the Committee holds all these restrictions on voting rights to be incompatible with Article 29 CRPD. This results both from the Concluding Observations on the first German State report 24 and from General Comment No 1 (2014) on equal recognition before the law. 25 Such a strict approach, which contradicts widespread state practice, is not confined to questions of voting rights. Rather, it follows from General Comment No 1 (2014) that the Committee strictly rejects any incapacitation of persons related to a disability and any form of substitute decision making for persons with disabilities. 26 In doing so, the Committee is well aware that general state practice is different. In fact, the Committee summarises in General Comment No 1 that most States examined exclude legal capacity in case of a perceived mental incapacity, which the Committee holds to be discriminatory.
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A last example of a rigorous approach not covered by State practice relates to involuntary confinement. In many States, mentally disabled persons may be placed in care institutions even against their will at the request of their guardian or another institution if certain requirements are met. 28 33 States must not simply ignore these views but take them into account. Unlike a Court, however, the Committee does not have the last word on what the Convention obligations are in a given case. It is true that the last word does not rest with an individual State party, either, but it rests with the community of States parties. Together, the States parties are the masters of the Covenant. They have the power to amend it or to give an authentic interpretation to its provision according to Article 31(3)(a) VCLT.
Composition and Procedure
Under a functional approach, a body's competences and powers should correspond to its composition and procedure. The UN treaty bodies have been assimilated to a certain degree to judicial organs, 34 and Courts are, indeed, in a position to formally establish what the law is. This is reflected in their composition. Judges of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) are expected to possess 'the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices' or to be 'jurisconsults of recognized competence in international law' according to Article 2 ICJ Statute. In a similar vein, judges of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia must 'possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices' according to Article 13 ICTY Statute, 35 and Article 21(1) ECHR provides that ECtHR judges 'must either possess the qualifications required for appointment to high judicial office or be jurisconsults of recognised competence'. Art. 34(2) CRPD, which requires a specialised qualification in the field of rights of persons with disabilities, 36 contrasts sharply with that standard formula for international judges.
The special expertise with regard to disabilities corresponds to the limited competences of the Committee ratione materiae. Unlike a human rights court and unlike the Human Rights Committee, the CeeRPD does not have to deal with a wide range of human rights applying to different groups of persons within society. Rather, the scope of the Committee is focused on the interests and needs of persons with disabilities. The Committee shares this feature with other Committees established under specialised human rights conventions such as the Committee on the Rights of the Child or the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CeeERD). This specialisation entails a certain risk of one-sidedness. This risk has been studied with regard to the Opinion of the CeeERD in the so called Sarrazin case. 37 
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42 logic' that a specialised body like the CeeERD in the Sarrazin case claims 'a predominant role' for the concerns for which it was created. 38 This leads to a 'structural bias' which makes the CeeERD underestimate competing human rights such as freedom of speech. 39 Given its specific mission and composition, the CeeRPD is in a similar position. 40 Therefore, the Committee is not in a position to act as a court, and it is only consequent that the Convention does not confer judicial powers on the Committee. The Committee is not intended to be a neutral arbiter, but to promote the interests and needs of persons with disabilities. This task, for which the Committee is perfectly qualified given its unique expertise, may be described as lobby function or 'advocatory role'. 41 This may explain why the Committee frequently opposes widespread State practice by a rigid understanding of Convention guarantees.
III. COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS AS SUBSIDIARY SOURCE
According to the Human Rights Committee, its Views 'exhibit some of the principal characteristics of a judicial decision.' 42 In fact, decisions of international courts have a strong influence on international law making. They are not only binding on the parties of a given case according to the principle of res iudicata. Rather, Article 38(1)(d) ICJ Statute gives them the authority of a subsidiary source. Although precedents are not formally binding under international law, the ICJ has invoked decisions by international courts, and ICJ judgments in particular, 'almost as being positive law', as Karol Wolfke rightly pointed out.
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Those who stress the quasi-judicial character of UN treaty bodies may be inclined to assimilate their law-making function to that of international courts and tribunals. According to Başak Ҫalı, the 'interpretative authority' of an organ does not depend on its power to issue binding decisions in a given case, so that the interpretative power of UN treaty bodies would be equal to that of international courts and tribunals. 44 disregard an interpretation given by the ECtHR or by another international human rights court, they risk repeated condemnations unless they finally abide by the court's interpretation or eventually succeed in convincing the court to readjust its interpretation. This dilemma has become evident in the Hirst saga, where the UK persistently refuses to grant prisoners the right to vote. Meanwhile, the refusal to abide by Hirst 45 has led to a series of further formal condemnations. 46 If a treaty body is not endowed with judiciary powers, by contrast, States are in a better position not to accept an interpretation and to uphold their point of view.
It is true that the Committee was established by State parties in order to make suggestions and recommendations with regard to the implementation of the CRPD. Given this formal mandate, Committee documents may constitute subsidiary means of interpretation within the meaning of Article 32 VCLT. 47 However, their persuasive authority does not equal the authority of international courts and tribunals under Article 38(1)(d) ICJ Statute.
IV. CRPD EVOLUTION THROUGH SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE AND THE ROLE OF STATE CONSENT
Karol Wolfke's studies on practice and state consent 48 open another perspective. CeeRPD documents may contribute to international practice and thus to international law making, either through evolutive treaty interpretation within the meaning of Article 31(3)(b) VCLT or through the creation of customary law. However, CeeRPD practice does not stand alone. States also produce abundant practice through domestic legislation and jurisprudence. 49 So, even repeated CeeRPD practice is seriously challenged where domestic legislation and jurisprudence remain unchanged. It is important to see, therefore, up to what extent CeeRPD claims are taken up by domestic practice. If a considerable number of States were to abolish domestic incapacity legislation in general and domestic legislation on the incapacity to participate in elections in particular, this would be a strong argument in favour of the Committee's strict understanding of Articles 12 and 29 CRPD. However, this does not seem to occur, so far. Rather, the Committee has to recognise that most States are not willing to follow its Convention reading. 50 Moreover, pure practice does not create law, as Karol Wolfke rightly confirmed. 51 Rather, the practice must be accepted as law. Treaty body practice might be considered to be so important that States are under an obligation to protest if they want to hinder a corresponding legal rule. 52 In fact, tolerating practice may justify 'the presumption of its acceptance as gives weight to its views as it is composed of eminent experts. However, unlike a Court, the Committee is not composed in such a way that would guarantee a fair balancing of rights of persons with disabilities with other community interests. This institutional one-sidedness distinguishes the CeeRPD from certain other human rights bodies such as the Human Rights Committee which may, therefore, have a higher persuasive authority. In fact, an expert body composed like the CeeRPD is likely to highlight the interests of persons with disabilities without attaching as much relevance to other legitimate interests. Moreover, as a body created by the CRPD and formally endowed with 'recommendation' power, the CRPD enjoys some formal authority.
Authority also depends on pre-existing, actual or future state consent. An interpretation found by the Committee has high persuasive authority if it is grounded on large scale State practice which is a sign of State consent. Even a progressive interpretation which goes beyond actual State consent may acquire persuasive authority if it is accepted either by the State concerned or by third States. If, however, States constantly refuse to abide by Committee views and uphold a different Convention reading instead, the Committee's persuasive authority is undermined.
Finally, in the absence of binding force, the persuasive authority of Committee views relies on the quality of its reasoning. If the Committee succeeds in proposing realistic alternatives, which improve the situation of persons with disabilities without entailing excessive material or immaterial costs, States are likely to abide.
